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In Hotelling style duopoly location games the product variety (or rm locations) is
typically not socially optimal. This occurs because the competitive outcome is driven by
the density of consumers at the margin while the socially optimal outcome depends on
the whole distribution of consumer locations/tastes. We consider a natural extension of the
standard model in which rms are imperfectly informed about the distribution of consumers,
in particular rms are uncertain about the consumer mean. In the uniform case, as the
aggregate uncertainty about the mean becomes large relative to the dispersion of consumers
about the mean, competitive locations become socially optimal. A limit result on prices for
discontinuous, log-concave densities shows the result will hold in a range of cases.
JEL: C72, D43, D81, L10, L13, R30, R39.
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1 Introduction
In Hotelling style duopoly location games, the product variety is typically not socially opti-
mal. This occurs because the competitive outcome is driven by the density of consumers at
the margin while the socially optimal outcome depends on the whole distribution of consumer
locations/tastes. We will show how, in a natural generalization of the Hotelling model, product
variety/locations become approximately optimal.
We consider a generalization of the standard model in which there is uncertainty over the
mean of the distribution of consumer types/locations, so-called demand location uncertainty (see
Casado-Izaga, F.J., 2000, Harter, 1996, Meagher and Zauner 2004, 2005). This is a natural
generalisation of the standard model, since in many real-world situations it is unlikely that rms
are perfectly informed about consumer preferences. Indeed the very existence of market research
proves that rms are not perfectly informed about demand conditions.
Thanks to Simon Anderson, John Stachurski and seminar participants at UNSW and the University of Sydney
yResearch School of Economics, Australian National University, ACT 0200, Australia, email:
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1We rst show that in the uniform version of the demand location uncertainty model the
competitive locations limit to the socially optimal locations, i.e. variety becomes optimal.
The second result shows the underlying economics at work | why rms internalize total
transport costs | and hence why the limiting optimal variety result can hold for equilibria in
non-uniform cases. The general result relies on uncovering a relationship between price dis-
crimination (in which socially optimal locations are a competitive equilibrium) and demand
location uncertainty. Price discrimination and competitive prices (a single price for each rm)
are normally thought of as distinct entities in spatial competition. Indeed, price discrimination
necessarily implies a schedule of prices, and hence a function, while competitive pricing requires
a single price per rm, which is just a number. However if one introduces demand location
uncertainty into the competitive pricing game then the rm specic prices become functions of
the uncertainty and limit to price discrimination prices when the aggregate uncertainty over the
mean becomes large compared to the idyosyncratic uncertainty of consumers around the mean.
2 The Demand Location Uncertainty Model
Consumers, x, are distributed on [a(M);b(M)] 2 R, with cumulative density function F(x;M).
M is the mean of the consumer density and is a random variable with density given by g(M),
referred to as the uncertainty distribution. Both the density functions are common knowledge.
The two rms, i = 1;2 have locations xi 2 R. Without loss of generality x1  x2. Production
costs are normalized to zero.
Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the good and has sucient income, y, to
buy one unit of the good. A consumer located at x consuming the good of rm i has indirect
utility
Vi(x;xi;pi) = y   pi   (xi   x)2; (1)
where pi is the (mill) price of good i and (xi x)2 is the standard quadratic transport cost/disutility
of distance term.
Firms simultaneously choose locations, uncertainty is resolved, and then rms simultaneously
choose prices under full information. Since prices are more easily adjusted than the characteristics
2of a good it is natural to consider the polar case in which rms set the optimal ex post prices in
the price subgame.
Given prices and locations, there is a unique location  at which a consumer is indierent
between the two rms: V1(;x1;p1) = V2(;x2;p2). Consumers buy one unit from the rm
that gives them the highest (net) utility, thus rms' prots are: 1 = p1F(;M) and 2 =
p2(1   F(;M)).
3 Results
3.1 An Example of Asymptotically Ecient Locations
Proposition 1. If consumers are uniformly distributed on [M   1
2;M + 1
2] with M uniformly
distributed on [ 1
2; 1
2] then the unique location-price equilibrium of the demand location uncer-











Proof. Meagher and Zauner (2005) characterise the unique location-price equilibrium of a de-
mand location uncertainty game in which consumers are uniformly distributed about a mean
which is also uniformly distributed. Our parameterization is dierent, but applying some basic




5 + 2   2
4(   1)
if 3 < : (3)
The limit result follows immediately. The socially optimal locations minimise the total transport
costs which is well known in the literature to occur when the rms are at the quartiles in the
uniform case, i.e. 1
4.
When demand location uncertainty about the mean is large relative to the idiosyncratic un-
certainty the equilibrium locations under mill pricing will be approximately socially optimal.
The question of the social optimality of equilibrium locations has been the key focus of the loca-
tion literature. Typically, in mill pricing models product/location dierentiation is excessive and
3in a few cases insucient, but not optimal. As McFadden and many others have observed the
most realistic description of competition in dierentiated products is for there to be signicant
uncertainty about consumer tastes. Our results show that the presence of large aggregate uncer-
tainty yields a completely dierent conclusion to the previous decades of analysis which focused
exclusively on idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Although technically a straight forward extension of the existing literature, the proof of
Proposition (1) is not very intuitive and it is not clear if the social optimality is merely a
coincidence. In the next section we take a deeper look at the underlying economic forces at
work.
3.2 A General Limit Result
The Hotelling location model is a discrete choice model and hence has inelastic demand at the
individual level. Individually inelastic demand and zero production costs mean that rm payos
are determined by prices and the split of customers. Similarly, social optimality simplies to
minimizing aggregate transport costs. Thus our approach to understanding social optimality is to
uncover how aggregate transport costs are internalised, at the limit, by rms through equilibrium
prices. We show the missing link between competitive prices and minimising aggregate transport
costs is their common link to spatial price discrimination.
Lederer and Hurter (1986) show, under a spatial price discrimination policy, each point of
the consumer distribution is essentially a separate market. Thus, in their equilibrium the more
distant rm charges a price of zero and the closer rm charges a price to extract the consumer
surplus arising from the dierence in transport costs | and this result is independent of specic
distributional assumptions. Thus if 1 is the closer rm, equilibrium (discrimination) prices for
location x, denoted pd
i, will be
pd
1(x;x1;x2) = (x   x2)2   (x   x1)2 (4)
and pd
2(x) = 0. The symmetric result holds if the roles are reversed.
We now establish a limit result between spatial price discrimination and competitive pricing
under demand location uncertainty.
4Proposition 2. Suppose f(x;M) is a the density of consumers, satisfying the two technical
conditions of Anderson et al (1997), with support [a(M);b(M)] such that
1. f is twice dierentiable and log concave in x, continuous in ;
2. f(a;M);f(b;M) 6= 0; and
3. lim!1 a = lim!1 b = M
then the limit of the competitive price when consumers have mean M is the spatial price discrim-





i(M;x1;x2); i = 1;2: (5)
Proof. By the symmetry between the rms we need only consider rm 1. From Anderson et al
(1997, p107) a unique competitive price equilibrium exist where p
1 is dened in three pieces.
The interval and expressions dening the three cases of equilibrium prices below, are also from
Anderson et al (1997, p107) and are not derived again here.
Case 1:(x1 + x2)  2(b + 1=f(b;M)). Firm 1 is the closer rm for all consumers, indeed
there is sucient asymmetry that rm 1 captures the whole market with an equilbrium price of
p
1 = (x2   x1)(x1 + x2   2b). Rearranging gives (b   x2)2   (b   x1)2 = pd
1(b;x1;x2). Now
lim!1 b = M so lim!1 p
1 = pd
1(M;x1;x2).
Case 2: (x1+x2)=2 2 [(a 1=f(a;M;));(b+1=f(b;M;))] yields an interior indierent
consumer, i.e.  2 [a;b] and p
1 = 2(x2 x1)F()=f(). Now lim!1 a = lim!1 b = M so
lim!1 p
1 = 2(x2   x1)lim!1(F(M)=f(M)) = 0. The interval which denes this case also
has a limit: (x1 + x2)=2 2 lim!1[(a   1=f(a;M;));(b + 1=f(b;M;))] = [M;M], which
is equivalent to requiring in the limit that the rms be symmetric either side of M, but in that
case pd
1 = 0 establishing the result.
Case3: (x1+x2)  2(a 1=f(a;M)). Here rm 1 is the more distant rm for all consumers
and there is sucient asymmetry that rm 1 bids down to marginal cost, i.e. 0. Thus p
1 = 0
which is also pd
1(M;x1;x2) in this case.
5Socially optimal locations require transport costs to be minimized. Equation (4) shows, that
under spatial price discrimination, prices and hence payos for a rm are determined by the
negative of the transport costs of the consumers who purchase from a rm. But as Proposition
2 shows the competitive payos under demand location uncertainty are approximately equal
to the price discrimination payos and hence similar forces, pushing towards socially optimal
varieties/locations, will be at work asymptotically in the demand location uncertainty game.
Of course, none of this establishes the existence of a location equilibrium in the general case,
or that any location equilibrium would be well behaved in . But if a well behaved location
equilibrium exists, as it does in the uniform example, then we will see asymptotically ecient
locations in the location uncertainty game, as aggregate uncertainty becomes large relative to
idiosyncratic uncertainty, for the same reason we get eciency under spatial price discrimination:
rm prots are driven by the aggregate of the dierence in transport costs.
References
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A., and J.-F. Thisse, 1992, Discrete choice theory of product dierentiation
(MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts).
Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., and R. Ramer, 1997, Location, location, location, Journal of Economic
Theory 77, 102{127.
Caplin, A. and B. Nalebu, 1991, Aggregation and imperfect competition: On the existence of equilib-
rium. Econometrica, 59:25{59.
Casado-Izaga, F.J., 2000, Location decisions: the role of uncertainty about consumer tastes. Journal of
Economics, 71:31{46.
D'Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J., and J.-F. Thisse, 1979, On Hotelling's \Stability in Competition",
Econometrica 47, 1145{1150.
Harter. J., 1996, Hotelling's competition with demand location uncertainty. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 15:327{334.
Lederer,P.and A. Hurter, Jr 1986 Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location, Econo-
metrica, 54 (3), 623 { 640.
Meagher, K. J. and K. Zauner, 2004, Product dierentiation and location decisions under demand
uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 117(2):201{216.
Meagher, K.J. and K. Zanuer, 2005, Location then price competition with uncertain consumer tastes.
Economic Theory, 25(4):799{818.
6